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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this case, defendants sought to intimidate plaintiff, a 
potential witness in federal court, by filing an allegedly 
frivolous lawsuit against him and using it to generate 
unfavorable publicity. We hold that plaintiff has standing to 
seek damages for that conduct under the anti-conspiracy 
sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. However, we also 
hold that because defendants acted within the attorney- 
client relationship, they cannot be considered conspirators. 
On that basis, we will affirm the dismissal by the District 
Court. 
 
                                2 
  
Plaintiff John J. Heffernan, an official with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, was assigned in January 1994 
to investigate possible insider trading violations growing out 
of a proposed bank merger. Defendant Robert W. Hunter 
came under scrutiny for the stock transactions he 
conducted during the relevant time. 
 
In January 1994, Hunter's five-year relationship with his 
paramour Joanne Kelly ended when she discovered that he 
had molested her eleven year-old daughter. The following 
month, criminal charges were lodged against Hunter in 
state court. 
 
On February 7, 1994, Kelly advised a county detective 
that she had information about Hunter's insider trading 
activities. The detective introduced her to Heffernan on 
February 24, 1994, who then interviewed her in connection 
with the SEC investigation. In the following months, Kelly 
and Heffernan began an intimate relationship, and were 
married in May 1995. Recognizing the conflict between his 
personal situation and his official duties, in August 1994 
Heffernan requested to be relieved from his assignment to 
the Hunter investigation. The SEC then transferred the 
case to a different regional office. 
 
Some weeks after bringing criminal charges against 
Hunter, Kelly and her daughter filed a civil suit in state 
court for damages caused by the molestation. The Kellys' 
lawyers demanded $2 million from Hunter to settle the suit. 
 
In preparation for his defense, Hunter and his attorney 
hired a detective who reported evidence of Heffernan's and 
Kelly's intimate relationship during July of 1994. The 
surveillance produced a videotape showing Heffernan and 
Kelly kissing, his car parked overnight in her garage, and 
Kelly leaving and meeting Heffernan at the train station. 
 
On August 29, 1994, defendant George Bochetto and his 
law firm, defendant Bochetto & Lentz, filed suit on Hunter's 
behalf in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania. The complaint alleged that 
Heffernan had caused Kelly to leave Hunter and to falsely 
accuse him of child molestation in an attempt to extort 
money through a civil suit. Moreover, Hunter alleged that 
Heffernan had supplied Kelly with financial information 
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obtained from the SEC investigation to enhance her 
prospects for a large settlement in her civil suit. Hunter 
also sought to halt the SEC investigation. 
 
The very next day, a local television station broadcasted 
portions of the surveillance videotape and interviewed 
Bochetto. He said of Heffernan, "[r]ather than take her 
[Kelly's] statement and go on with the investigation, he 
[Heffernan] took her statement and decided he wanted to 
stay for the night . . . It's literally the equivalent of the law 
enforcement agent jumping into your wife's bed, and 
prosecuting you from it . . . He starts sharing with her 
information which we believe she is now using to demand 
two million dollars of Mr. Hunter to settle an alleged 
molestation case in Montgomery County." 
 
Defendants also hired a publicist who prepared and 
distributed press releases describing the material in 
Hunter's complaint. This prompted newspaper coverage 
with lurid descriptions such as "sex and million dollar 
business scandal" (The Reporter (N. Penn.), Sept. 1, 1994), 
"a bizarre sex-and-business plot worthy of novelist 
Raymond Chandler" (Phil. Inq., Aug. 31, 1994), and others.1 
 
The District Court entered summary judgment in 
Hunter's case in favor of Heffernan on September 26, 1996, 
following the previous entry of a similar order in favor of 
the other defendants SEC, and Heffernan's supervisors. See 
Hunter v. Heffernan, Civ. A. 94-5340, 1996 WL 694237 
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 1996); Hunter v. Heffernan, 879 F. Supp. 
494 (E.D. Pa. 1995). 
 
Heffernan then turned around and sued Hunter, 
Bochetto and Bochetto's law firm on September 25, 1997 in 
the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 
Heffernan's complaint included claims under 42 U.S.C. 
SS 1985(1), 1985(2), and 1986, as well as a state law count. 
It is this action that presently concerns us. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Some months later, on June 9, 1995, Hunter was convicted of 
molestation and sentenced to eight to fourteen years imprisonment. In 
May 1998, he pleaded guilty on several insider trading charges, and in 
April 1999, was sentenced to a term of incarceration. That conviction is 
presently on appeal. 
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The section 1985(2) count asserted that Hunter and 
Bochetto had conspired to file a frivolous lawsuit and 
disseminate defamatory information to the media to 
intimidate and punish Heffernan so as to affect his 
attendance and testimony as a witness against Hunter in 
federal court proceedings. The section 1985(1) claim cited 
the same acts as part of a conspiracy to impede Heffernan 
in the discharge of his duties as an officer of the United 
States, and to injure him in his person and property 
through harassment. Heffernan also asserted a violation of 
42 U.S.C. S 1986 arising from the conspirators' failure to 
prevent the section 1985 violations. Finally, the complaint 
advanced a state statutory claim based on wrongful use of 
civil proceedings. 
 
The District Court dismissed the complaint via two orders 
pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In the first, it held that 
witnesses did not have standing to bring an action under 
section 1985(2). Because the statute's remedy provision 
refers only to "the party so injured," reasoned the Court, a 
witness such as Heffernan had no right to sue under 
section 1985(2). As to the section 1985(1) count, the Court 
held that Hunter's filing of the lawsuit against Heffernan 
could not amount to "force, intimidation or threat." 
However, Heffernan was granted leave to amend the section 
1985(1) claim with respect to the publicity campaign. 
 
Heffernan amended but, in the second order, the Court 
dismissed the 1985(1) count because, under the 
circumstances, there could be no conspiracy between 
attorney and client. Bochetto and his firm, according to the 
Court, were acting on behalf of Hunter in defense of the 
SEC charges as well as the other criminal and civil matters 
pending against him at the time they launched the publicity 
campaign. Having failed to establish a predicate section 
1985 claim, Heffernan's section 1986 claim failed as well. 
Finally, declining to exercise discretionary supplemental 
jurisdiction, the Court dismissed the remaining state-law 
claim without prejudice. 
 
The plaintiff's appeal is limited to the District Court's 
alleged errors in: first, finding a lack of standing under 42 
U.S.C. S 1985(2), and second, refusing to treat lawyer and 
client as conspirators. 
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A dismissal with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6) produces 
a final order appealable under 28 U.S.C. S 1291, and one 
subject to plenary review. Malia v. General Elec. Co., 23 
F.3d 828, 830 (3d Cir. 1994). All well-pleaded facts in the 
complaint and reasonable inferences are accepted as true. 
See id. The dismissal will be affirmed "only if it is certain 
that no relief can be granted under any set of facts which 
could be proved." Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare 
Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912, 919 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(internal quotations removed). 
 
I. 
 
Heffernan was not a party to the prospective SEC 
prosecution, but he was a potential and likely witness in 
those proceedings, both before a grand jury, and later in 
federal court. The issue is whether he, as a potential 
witness, has a right of action under the Civil Rights 
conspiracy statute. 
 
The relevant portion of 42 U.S.C. S 1985(2),first part, 
along with the remedial provision in 42 U.S.C. S 1985(3), 
reads: "If two or more persons . . . conspire to deter, by 
force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any 
court of the United States from attending such court, or 
from testifying to any matter pending therein . . . or to 
injure such party or witness . . . or to influence. . . or to 
injure such juror . . . on account of any verdict, 
presentment, or indictment . . . the party so injured or 
deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages." 
Although section 1985(2) speaks to threats and deterrents 
against "any party or witness," the remedial language in 
section 1985(3) granting an action for damages refers only 
to "the party."2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. 42 U.S.C. S 1985(2) and the remedial portion of 42 U.S.C. S 1985(3) 
state in full: 
 
       (2) Obstructing justice; intimidating party, witness, or juror 
 
       If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to 
       deter, by force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in 
       any court of the United States from attending such court, or 
       from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully, and 
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Section 1985 derives mostly from the Civil Rights Act of 
1871, ch. 22, S 2, 17 Stat. 13, and in lesser part not 
relevant to this appeal, from the Conspiracy Act of 1861, 
ch. 33, 12 Stat. 284. Almost Kantian in length and 
complexity, the revision that eventually became section 
1985 is a paradigm of poor draftsmanship. In Brawer v. 
Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 837 (3d Cir. 1976), Judge Aldisert 
referred to "the perfidious syntax of S 1985(2)." In somewhat 
less colorful terms, the Supreme Court acknowledged that 
the "length and style" of the 1871 Act "make it somewhat 
difficult to parse." Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 724 
(1983). 
 
The 1871 Act was codified pursuant to the Act of June 
20, 1874, ch. 333, 18 Stat. 113-14, which charged 
Secretary of State Hamilton Fish with preparing the Revised 
Statutes of the United States. Brawer, 535 F.3d at 837-38 
& n.16. Codified as R.S. S 1980, the statute now appears 
unchanged in Title 42. Id. at 837-38. A number of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his person or 
       property on account of his having so attended or testified, or to 
       influence the verdict, presentment, or indictment of any grand or 
       petit juror in any such court, or to injure such juror in his 
       person or property on account of any verdict, presentment, or 
       indictment lawfully assented to by him, or of his being or having 
       been such juror; or if two or more persons conspire for the 
       purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any 
       manner, the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with 
       intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws, or 
       to injure him or his property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting 
       to enforce, the right of any person, or class of persons, to the 
       equal protection of the laws; 
 
       (3) Depriving persons of rights or privileges 
 
       . . . . in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one 
       or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any 
       act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby 
       another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of 
       having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the 
       United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an 
       action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or 
       deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators. 
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modifications were made to the statute during the 
codification process, but the Supreme Court, 
acknowledging these alterations, has concluded that"[t]he 
reclassification was not intended to change the substantive 
meaning of the 1871 Act." Kush, 460 U.S. at 724 & n.6. 
 
To properly interpret section 1985, it is necessary to 
compare the original and codified texts. Both proscribe 
conspiracies to deter "any party or witness. " (emphasis 
added). However, codification brought unsettling changes to 
the remedy section, which now states that "the party so 
injured . . . may have an action for the recovery of 
damages." (emphasis added). Defendants argue that this 
language limits recovery to "parties" involved in litigation 
despite the fact that the original text was not so limited. It 
read that "the person so injured . . . may have and 
maintain an action for the recovery of damages." (emphasis 
added). 
 
Not surprisingly, courts have differed as to whether a 
remedy is limited to parties, or extends to witnesses and 
jurors as well. The Supreme Court has taken a "firm" 
position on this issue, stating "We express no opinion 
regarding respondents' argument . . . that only litigants, 
and not witnesses, may bring S 1985(2) claims. We leave 
[that] issue[ ] for the courts below to resolve on remand." 
Haddle v. Garrison, 119 S. Ct. 489, 491 n.3 (1998). 
 
By focusing on the codified language in isolation, two 
Courts of Appeals have concluded that relief is not available 
for "a mere witness." Rylewicz v. Beaton Services, Ltd., 888 
F.2d 1175, 1180 (7th Cir. 1989); David v. United States, 
820 F.2d 1038, 1040 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 
On the other hand, in Brever v. Rockwell International 
Corp., 40 F.3d 1119 (10th Cir. 1994), the Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit refused to read the term " `party' so 
literally as to mean `named party to an action.' " Id. at 1125 
n.7. To conclude otherwise would "emasculate" the statute, 
which specifically designates witnesses as " `protected 
persons.' " Id. at 1125-26 n.7. The Court was especially 
troubled by the fact that under an excessively literal 
reading in cases involving federal grand juries, only the 
United States would have standing. Id. at 1126 n.7. 
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We noted the split of authority on witness standing in 
Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1206-07 (3d Cir. 
1988), but did not rule on the issue because the plaintiff in 
that case was "neither a witness nor a litigant." Id. at 1207. 
This appeal, however, places the issue squarely before us. 
 
As have other courts, we confess some perplexity with the 
convoluted, rambling and largely unstructured language of 
the 1871 Act and its 1874 codification. But after patient 
parsing of the text, it is clear enough that Congress' intent 
was to extend protection to witnesses and jurors as well as 
to parties. The word "persons" as used in the 1871 version 
accomplished that result and the codified text need not be 
read as inconsistent with the original. The word"party" 
may well have been, in the codifiers' minds, simply a 
synonym for "person" or "individual." 
 
We reach the same conclusion even if we do not look to 
the original text. The codified remedy section states that if 
one or more conspirators "do . . . any act in furtherance of 
the . . . conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his 
person or property, . . ., the party so injured or deprived 
may have an action for the recovery of damages." 42 U.S.C. 
S 1985(3) (emphasis added). In this clause,"the party so 
injured" refers back to the phrase "whereby another is 
injured." The phrasing and context persuade us that the 
term "party" is not meant to limit the more general term 
"another." Thus, the meaning of "another" in the section 
1985(2) context is not defined by section 1985(3)'s reference 
to "party," but rather by section 1985(2)'s reference to 
parties, witnesses, and jurors. See Brever, 40 F.3d at 1125- 
26 n.7. This reading is in accord with our caution in 
Brawer that "it could hardly be argued that Congress gave 
[the codifiers] a carte blanche right of amendment." 535 
F.2d at 838 n.16. 
 
We therefore find ourselves in accord with Brever and 
hold that a witness or juror may be a "party" entitled to 
maintain an action under section 1985(2). The fact that 
Heffernan, at the time of the alleged conspiracy, had 
neither appeared as a witness, nor been subpoenaed, does 
not affect his standing. It is enough that he was a potential 
and obviously important witness. See Malley-Duff & Assoc., 
Inc. v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 792 F.2d 341, 355 & n. 11 (3d 
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Cir. 1986) (" `Deterrence or intimidation of a potential 
witness can be just as harmful to a litigant as threats to a 
witness who has begun to testify.' ") (quoting Chahal v. 
Paine Webber, Inc., 725 F.2d 20, 24 (2d Cir. 1984)), aff'd, 
483 U.S. 143 (1987). 
 
Whether Hunter was aware at the time he filed his suit 
that Heffernan had already been removed from the SEC 
investigation does not appear in the record. In any event, 
naming Heffernan as a defendant appears to have been, in 
part, a ploy to affect his credibility as a witness in federal 
court proceedings growing out of the insider trading 
investigation. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that Heffernan has standing to 
bring a section 1985(2) claim. That, however, does not 
mean that he can successfully establish a right to recovery 
here. 
 
II. 
 
In addition to alleging a violation of section 1985(2), 
Heffernan charged defendants under section 1985(1) with 
conspiring to impede the performance of his duties by filing 
a frivolous lawsuit and disseminating false and libelous 
information about him to the media. In contrast to the 
preceding discussion, there is no dispute over Heffernan's 
standing to bring suit as a government agent under section 
1985(1). See Windsor v. The Tennessean, 719 F.2d 155, 
161 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 
Section 1985(1) states in relevant part that if"two or 
more persons . . . conspire to prevent, by force, 
intimidation, or threat, . . . [an officer of the United States] 
from discharging any duties thereof; . . . or to injure him in 
his person or property on account of his lawful discharge of 
the duties of his office, or while engaged in the lawful 
discharge thereof," then a cause of action exists.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. 42 U.S.C. S 1985(1) states in full: 
 
       (1) Preventing officer from performing duties. 
 
       If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to 
       prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, any person from 
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Both the section 1985(1) and 1985(2) claims require a 
conspiracy. Whether Heffernan has set out actionable 
conspiracies is therefore a threshold issue and one that we 
find dispositive.4 
 
Looking to state law, the District Court concluded that no 
conspiracy can exist where an attorney's advice or advocacy 
is for the benefit of his client rather than for the attorney's 
"sole personal benefit." The Court found this principle 
consistent with federal law that perceives no conspiracy in 
the concerted activity of an employee and a corporation, 
usually termed the "intracorporate conspiracy doctrine." 
 
There are few cases in the Courts of Appeals discussing 
attorney-client conspiracies in the section 1985 context, 
but two opinions do provide some guidance. In Doherty v. 
American Motors Corp., 728 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1984), the 
plaintiff alleged a conspiracy under section 1985(2) between 
a corporation and its inside, as well as its outside, counsel. 
Citing the general rule that a corporation cannot conspire 
with its agents, the Court found that no conspiracy existed, 
remarking, "it is clear from the record that the actions of 
the [the corporation's] attorneys were motivated not by 
personal concerns but by concerns for their clients." Id. at 
339-40. 
 
The other case, Travis v. Gary Community Mental Health 
Center, Inc., 921 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1990), included a claim 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       accepting or holding any office, trust, or place of confidence 
       under the United States, or from discharging any duties thereof; 
       or to induce by like means any officer of the United States to 
       leave any State, district, or place, where his duties as an officer 
       are required to be performed, or to injure him in his person or 
       property on account of his lawful discharge of the duties of his 
       office, or while engaged in the lawful discharge thereof, or to 
       injure his property so as to molest, interrupt, hinder, or impede 
       him in the discharge of his official duties[, then a cause of 
action 
       exists under section 1985(3)]. 
 
4. Accordingly, we need not determine whether the defendants' activities 
amounted to "force, intimidation, or threat," or whether plaintiff has 
suffered damages within the terms of the statute. Nor do we reach the 
defendants' arguments raising the statute of limitations, qualified 
immunity, causation, or the First Amendment. 
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under section 1985(2) by an employee who alleged a 
retaliatory discharge by the defendant's employees. The 
Court concluded that joint conduct by employees did not 
amount to a conspiracy. Id. at 110. Of particular relevance 
is the Court's discussion about the defendant's 
consultation with its outside counsel. Holding that this too 
was not a conspiracy, the Court reasoned that "[t]reating 
involvement of a lawyer as the key unlocking S 1985 would 
discourage corporations from obtaining legal advice before 
acting, hardly a sound step to take." Id. at 111. 
 
In cases not necessarily involving attorney-client 
conspiracies, the Courts of Appeals are divided on the 
applicability of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine in the 
section 1985 context. See McAndrew v. Lockheed Martin 
Corp., 177 F.3d 1310, 1312 (11th Cir. 1999) (listing the 
Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits 
as ascribing to the doctrine, but choosing to follow the 
First, Third, and Tenth, which had taken the opposite 
position.).5 
 
We have addressed this issue in several opinions. In 
Novotny v. Great American Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 
584 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1978) (en banc), vacated on other 
gds., 442 U.S. 366 (1979), the plaintiff's complaint did not 
allege that the corporate defendant conspired with its 
officers and directors, but rather that a conspiracy existed 
between the individual officers. Therefore, the issue was 
whether concerted actions by officers and employees of a 
corporation could be the basis of a claim under section 
1985(3). We held that it could. Id. at 1257. 
 
Subsequently, in Robison v. Canterbury Village, Inc., 848 
F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1988), we pointed out that Novotny did 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The doctrine has also been carried over to alleged conspiracies 
involving govenmental entities. See Wright v. Illinois Dep't of Children & 
Family Services, 40 F.3d 1492, 1507-09 (7th Cir. 1994) (no conspiracy 
by state agency and co-employees under section 1985(2) for retaliatory 
disciplinary action against case workers); Hull v. Cuyahoga Valley Joint 
Voc. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 926 F.2d 505, 509-10 (6th Cir. 1991) (agents 
and employees of a public school board did not form a conspiracy under 
section 1985); Runs After v. United States, 766 F.2d 347, 354 (8th Cir. 
1985) (no conspiracy involving members of Indian tribal council). 
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not "evaluate the force of the proposition that a corporation 
cannot conspire with itself." Id. at 431 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Robison held that a corporation and its 
president cannot form a conspiracy under section 1985(3). 
Id. (citing, inter alia, Doherty, 728 F.2d at 339-40; 
Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190, 196 (7th Cir. 1972)). 
We noted, however, that a conspiracy may exist between a 
corporation and an officer "if the officer is acting in a 
personal, as opposed to official, capacity." Id. 
 
Along these lines, courts that have followed the doctrine 
allow an exception when the employees have acted for their 
sole personal benefit and thus outside the course and scope 
of their employment.6 That exception is based on the 
proposition that since the employer would not be subject to 
liability under respondeat superior, it would not be a 
conspirator. See Johnson v. Hills & Dales General Hosp., 40 
F.3d 837, 841 (6th Cir. 1994). Similar conclusions have 
been reached in state-court cases involving civil 
conspiracies. See, e.g., Fraidin v. Weitzman, 611 A.2d 1046, 
1077-80 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) (no conspiracy when 
attorneys act within scope of employment unless they act 
for their "sole personal benefit"). 
 
Although the case law on intracorporate conspiracies 
provides a convenient analogy for the attorney-client 
situation, there are important differences between the 
agency relationships involved in private corporate activities 
and those arising in the practice of law. The right of a 
litigant to independent and zealous counsel is at the heart 
of our adversary system and, indeed, invokes constitutional 
concerns. Counsels' conduct within the scope of 
representation is regulated and enforced by disciplinary 
bodies established by the courts. Abuses in litigation are 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Some -- but not all -- courts have found exceptions to the doctrine 
where there were numerous acts constituting a broad pattern of 
discrimination. See Douglas G. Smith, Comment, The Intracorporate 
Conspiracy Doctrine and 42 U.S.C. S 1985(3): The Original Intent, 90 Nw. 
U. L. Rev. 1125, 1159-63 (1996). Furthermore, if an entity were 
established for the purpose of violating civil rights, different 
considerations might also apply. Id. at 1163-65. These exceptions are 
not implicated in this appeal and we therefore need not discuss them. 
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punishable by sanctions administered by the courts in 
which the litigation occurs.7 
 
This regulatory framework provides third parties with 
protection that is lacking in the corporate field. Despite the 
absence of such safeguards in the business setting, most 
courts nevertheless apply the intracorporate conspiracy 
ban. That being so, it follows all the more that we should 
enforce the ban on conspiracies in the attorney-client 
context where even more compelling policy concerns exist. 
 
It is, of course, axiomatic that if the challenged conduct 
occurs outside the scope of representation, no reason for 
immunity exists and the attorney and the client, as 
individuals, could form a conspiracy. See Johnson, 40 F.3d 
at 840-41; Doherty, 728 F.2d at 339-40. However, the mere 
fact that attorneys have "mixed motives," such as 
"enhancing" their reputation by aggressive representation, 
does not remove their conduct from the scope of the 
agency. See Los Angeles Airways, Inc. v. Davis, 687 F.2d 
321, 328 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 
The challenged activity may violate the canons of ethics, 
but so long as it is within the scope of representation, it 
does not eliminate the exemption from a conspiracy charge 
under section 1985. "[S]imply because a lawyer's conduct 
may violate the rules of ethics does not mean that the 
conduct is actionable, in damages or for injunctive relief." 
Maritrans GP, Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 602 A.2d 
1277, 1284 (Pa. 1992). The offended third party has a 
remedy under state law through court imposed sanctions or 
reference to state disciplinary bodies. 
 
The statements that Bochetto made on camera and the 
information in the press releases about Heffernan's conduct 
with Kelly were obviously aimed at discrediting him as a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. See 28 U.S.C. S 1927; Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c). Courts have the inherent 
power to sanction attorneys for bad-faith conduct that is not otherwise 
covered by Rule 11 or section 1927. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 
U.S. 32 (1991). 
 
Other remedies might be available to plaintiffs. Indeed, in this case, 
Heffernan has renewed his claim for wrongful use of civil proceedings 
under 42 Pa.C.S.A. S 8351 in state court. 
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witness against Hunter. As such, the attorney was acting 
within the scope of his representation. Whether the chosen 
means were ethical or appropriate is a separate issue. 
Attorneys might use unethical tactics in representing 
clients and yet remain squarely within the scope of their 
agency. 
 
We cannot say that the activities of Bochetto and his firm 
were beyond the scope of the attorney-client relationship so 
as to make them susceptible to characterization as a 
conspiracy under section 1985. Therefore, because 
Heffernan has failed to establish a conspiracy under either 
section 1985(1) or (2), we must affirm the dismissal of this 
case in its entirety.8 
 
Because the record does not provide the complete 
background of the defendants' decision to embark on this 
publicity campaign, we hesitate to be too specific in 
criticizing their conduct. However, on the facts alleged, we 
do not wish to leave the impression that we condone the 
lawyer's tactics or find them worthy of anything but 
extreme disapproval. 
 
Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct 3.6(c) 
permits a lawyer to "state without elaboration . . .(2) the 
information contained in a public record." This, of course, 
reflects the general privilege applied to court proceedings. 
We know that the privilege is sometimes abused by 
practitioners who maliciously insert inflammatory material 
into court documents hoping for public dissemination. We 
note, however, that the privilege is qualified and leaves 
open the possibility of a defamation suit. See Computer Aid, 
Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., Nos. Civ. A. 96-CV-4150, Civ. 
A. 97-CV-0284, 1999 WL 458151, at *5-*7 (E.D. Pa. June 
15, 1999); see also Williams v. Williams, 246 N.E.2d 333 
(N.Y. 1969); Sciandra v. Lynett, 187 A.2d 586, 588-89 (Pa. 
1963). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Because the predicate 1985 claims cannot stand, dismissal was 
appropriate for the section 1986 claim. Robison, 848 F.2d at 431 n.10. 
The District Court also acted within its discretion in dismissing the 
plaintiff's remaining state law claim without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. 
S 1367(c)(3). 
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In the case before us, there is some question whether the 
publicity generated by the attorneys went beyond the 
"without elaboration" qualification of Rule 3.6(c). We are not 
so naive as to believe that there is no exception to the 
admonition that lawyers are to try their cases only in the 
courtroom. There may be circumstances where 
conscientious lawyers must act to defend against adverse 
publicity where their clients have been tried and convicted 
by the media long before trial, or where the opposing 
litigants -- government or private -- have blanketed the 
community with damaging publicity. See Gentile v. State 
Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1042-43 (1991) (plurality); 
Jonathan M. Moses, Note, Legal Spin Control: Ethics and 
Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion, 95 Col. L. Rev. 
1811 (1995). 
 
The record before us, however, is silent as to whether 
there was any such provocation or justification for the 
publicity campaign. We say no more other than to echo the 
lament expressed by Judge Gawthrop in Doe v. Kohn Nast 
& Graf, P.C., 866 F. Supp. 190, 195 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1994): 
 
       "I find it a source of some regret that in this day and 
       age, the vogue appears to be that lawyers seem to be 
       unable to resist corralling a press conference . . . to 
       trumpet the alleged virtues of their case before the jury 
       has been impaneled. Too many lawyers are trying to try 
       their cases in that arena rather than the proper forum 
       for getting to the truth, within the bounds of due 
       process and fair play. . . . Rule . . . 3.6(a) . . . seems to 
       be more and more honored in the breach, treated as a 
       canonical dead letter, than genuinely adhered to by 
       trial lawyers, either in letter or in spirit." 
 
The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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